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Abstract 
Purpose:  Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there are two institutional logics of corporate 
governance: Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  This paper examines how Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic are embedded in public discourse on corporate governance. 
 
Design/methodology/approach:  A selection of codes of practice and corporate annual reports 
from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom are sampled.  Extracts from the 
sampled texts are collected and analysed.  These extracts relate to eight aspects of corporate 
governance (including incentive schemes and performance measures). 
 
Findings:  Public discourse on corporate governance is consistent with both Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic.  Investor Logic is more deeply embedded in the sampled codes of practice 
than Corporate Logic; whereas both logics are deeply embedded in the sampled corporate 
annual reports. 
 
Theoretical implications: Despite Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing 
assumptions about human behaviour and implications for corporate governance, these logics 
appear to have merged into a new institutional logic. 
 
Paper Type: Empirical 
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This paper examines how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in public 
discourse on corporate governance as represented by codes of practice and corporate annual 
reports.  Corporate Logic asserts that directors and executives are knowledgeable 
professionals that can be trusted by stakeholders to act in their best interests (Zajac and 
Westphal, 2004).  By contrast, Investor Logic asserts that executives are self-interested, 
independent directors should be appointed to control executives, and financial incentives are 
necessary to align the interests of executives with those of shareholders (Zajac and Westphal, 
2004).  This research is not concerned with the empirical validity of these knowledge claims.  
Instead, this research is concerned with how institutional logics are embedded in public 
discourse.  Institutional logics are beliefs, ideas, norms, rules and values that are a coalescing 
discourse with a durable meaning, which materially influences organisational behaviour 
(Thornton et al., 2005).  While Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) only examined a few aspects 
of corporate governance, this research examines many aspects of corporate governance in 
order to understand how Corporate Logic and Investor Logic influence organisational 
behaviour. 
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This paper is organised as follows.  The literature on institutional theory, discourse theory and 
institutional logics is reviewed in section 2.  In assessing prior research, a gap in knowledge is 
articulated.  How this gap is studied is discussed in section 3.  This includes a description of 
the research questions and method.  Section 4 presents the findings from the discourse 
analysis of three codes and three corporate annual reports.  The findings closely examine the 
consistency between the theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic and 
the principles and recommendations in codes and policies and practices in corporate annual 
reports.  A discussion of the findings is presented in section 5, and considers how both logics 
can co-exist in public discourse despite having opposing implications for corporate 
governance.  Concluding comments are drawn in section 6. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Institutional theory has traditionally sought to explain how and why organisations in the same 
industries become homogeneous over time (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Homogeneity 
amongst organisations occurs as organisations conform to societal expectations.  Institutions 
are societal expectations that have become taken-for-granted or ingrained in society.  By 
conforming to societal expectations, organisations reproduce and empower institutions.  There 
are three institutional pressures that compel organisations to conform (Scott, 2008).  
Organisations are subject to: First, coercive pressure through laws and law enforcement; 
Second, normative pressure through codes of practice and certification by professional bodies; 
Third, mimetic pressure through people‟s desire to imitate others.  However, organisations are 
not slaves to institutions; organisations may symbolically conform to or resist institutional 
pressures.  Further, institutional theory does not rule out heterogeneity amongst organisations.  
For example, heterogeneity can arise when institutional pressures are weak or conflicting. 
 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance     Page 4 
Discourse theory is the study of how people use language to interpret and construct their 
social reality (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000).  Language encompasses all talk and texts, 
whereas discourse is a subset of language that has a durable meaning and influences the 
behaviour of individuals and organisations.  Further, discourse defines power relationships 
and knowledge claims in society (Phillips, 2003).  Embedded in discourse are beliefs, ideas, 
norms, rules and values, which are learnt and reproduced through talk and texts, particular in 
the context of organisational discourse.  Organisations are both enabled and constrained by 
discourse, particularly Grand Discourse and Mega-Discourse (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000).  
These are highly integrated and ordered sets of language that represents the taken-for-granted 
or universal way of talking, writing and acting.  Thus, Grand Discourse and Mega-Discourse 
are akin to institutions (Phillips, 2003; Schmidt, 2010).  Through the production and 
consumption of texts, organisations can influence and are influenced by institutions or Mega-
Discourse (Phillips et al., 2004). 
 
At the intersection of institutional and discourse theory are institutional logics, which 
Thornton and Ocasio (1999, p.804) defined as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and 
reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their 
social reality.”  Societal institutions include the corporation, market, state, family, profession, 
and religion (Friedland and Alford, 1991), and these institutions are defined and shaped by a 
range of institutional logics within different societies or countries (Thornton et al., 2005).  
Institutional logics define what organisational behaviours are and are not socially expected 
and desirable.  However, institutional logics can change over time as new ways of thinking 
and acting challenge existing institutions.  For example, Thornton et al. (2005) found that 
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public accounting transitioned from Fiduciary Logic to Corporate Logic as growing revenues 
and profits become the mission of accountancy firms following World War II. 
 
 
Zajac and Wesphal (2004) argue that there are two institutional logics of corporate 
governance, namely Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, which define and shape corporate 
governance systems that are both internal and external to the corporation.  Rooted in 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman et al., 2004) and stewardship 
theory (Donaldson, 1990; Davis et al., 1997), Corporate Logic asserts that management 
(directors and executives) are trustworthy and have the specialist expertise to govern and 
manage corporations in the best interests of all stakeholders.  By contrast, Investor Logic 
asserts that management, in the absence of controls and incentives, will act opportunistically.  
Only investors, through the invisible hand of capital markets, can monitor and discipline 
management to ensure that shareholder value is maximised.  This is rooted in agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980).  Based on opposing assumptions about human 
behaviour and the corporate objective, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have opposing 
implications for corporate governance, which are summarised in Table 1. 
 
The eight aspects of corporate governance that are reviewed in Table 1 build on Zajac and 
Westphal‟s (2004) theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Given a 
positive view of human behaviour and a stakeholder-oriented corporate objective, Corporate 
Logic implies that non-executive directors will be strategic advisors to executives.  Vertical 
and horizontal equity (e.g. comparable to others in similar roles, but fair to employees and 
other stakeholders) will be the primary determinants of the remuneration of non-executive 
directors and executives.  Internal (financial and non-financial) performance measures will be 
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used to assess the performance of executives, who may receive modest bonuses in recognition 
of their commitment and loyalty.  By contrast, Investor Logic has a negative view of human 
behaviour and a shareholder-oriented corporate objective.  To monitor executives, non-
executive directors should be financially independent of the corporation.  As capital markets 
are efficient, external (market-based) performance measures (e.g. total shareholder return) are 
not as easily manipulated by executives as internal performance measures.  Contingent on 
external performance measures, financial incentives for executives are necessary to align their 
interests with those of shareholders.   
 
Table 1: Theoretical Conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 
Aspects of Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Human behaviour Executives are trustworthy and 
motivated by intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards 
Executives are opportunistic and 
motivated by extrinsic rewards 
Corporate objective Stakeholder value maximisation  Shareholder value maximisation 
Independence of the board of 
directors 
Both non-executive and executive 
directors should be independent of 
mind 
Board should comprise of a 
majority of non-executive directors, 
who are financially independent 
Role of the board of directors 
(particularly, non-executive 
directors) 
The board (and non-executive 
directors) is a strategic advisor to 
executives 
The board (particularly non-
executive directors) is a monitor 
and judge of executives 
Role of the remuneration 
committee 
The remuneration committee is a 
strategic human resources advisor; 
it has to ensure there is a balance of 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards for 
executives. 
The remuneration committee 
(comprising of entirely independent 
directors) is an evaluator of the 
performance of executives; it has to 
ensure that incentives are designed 
to align executives‟ interests with 
those of shareholders. 
Remuneration policies and 
practices for non-executive 
directors 
Fees; Retirement payments Fees – Cash and shares; No 
retirement payments 
Remuneration policies and 
practices for executives 
Mainly fixed remuneration. 
Increases depend on stakeholder 
value and comparisons with other 
executives. 
Mainly variable remuneration 
including short- and long-term 
incentives. Increases depend on 
shareholder value. 
Performance measures for 
evaluating executives 
Financial and non-financial Financial and market-based 
measures 
 
Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic 
to Investor Logic amongst US corporations.  When US corporations adopted long-term 
incentive plans, Zajac and Westphal (1995) found that justifications of these plans were 
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consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, 
long-term incentive plans may be adopted to attract and retain talented executives; whereas 
consistent with Investor Logic, long-term incentive plans may be adopted to align executives‟ 
interests with those of shareholders.  While the choice of justification was dependent on the 
power of the board and firm performance, justifications consistent with Investor Logic 
become more common over time.  Further, Zajac and Westphal (2004) found that investors 
reaction to the adoption of stock repurchase plans changed from negative in the early 1980s to 
positive in the mid 1980s, irrespective of these plans being implemented.  Consistent with 
Investor Logic, investors reacted favourably to stock repurchase plans as such plans 
represented management‟s intention to return free cash flows to the capital markets.  This is 
inconsistent with Corporate Logic because stock repurchase plans represent an admission by 
management that they do not have any future investment opportunities. 
 
Crombie (2009) and Crombie et al. (2010) challenge Zajac and Westphal‟s (2004) conclusion 
that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic to Investor Logic.  In a study of the 
largest 50 US corporations, Crombie et al. (2010) found that justifications of the Chief 
Executive Officer‟s (CEO‟s) remuneration in 1998 and 2007 proxy statements were 
consistent with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Contra to Zajac and Westphal 
(1995), they found that the presence of these justifications increased over time to the point of 
where almost all proxy statements contained the same set of justifications.  Similarly, 
Crombie (2009) found the same pattern of diffusion in the annual reports of the largest 50 
publicly listed companies in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.  These 
findings indicate that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become the taken-for-
granted ways of justifying executive remuneration or institutionalised discourse. 
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Crombie (2009) and Crombie et al. (2010) also studied codes of practice on corporate 
governance.  These are mainly produced by regulators, stock exchanges, investors‟ 
associations and directors‟ associations.  Codes often include principles and recommendations 
on executive remuneration.  Both studies found that justifications of remuneration are 
diffused first in codes and then in corporate annual reports (or proxy statements), indicating 
that codes are the manifestation of coercive and normative pressure.  Further, these 
justifications of remuneration are consistent both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  
Interpreted through Phillips et al.‟s (2004) discursive model of institutionalisation, this 
evidence shows that texts are influential and corporations can gain legitimacy (or attest to 
their conformance to societal expectations) through their corporate annual reports.  However, 
Crombie (2009), Crombie et al. (2010) and Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) did not examine 
how deeply embedded Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are in the discourse on corporate 
governance because only justifications of executive remuneration are studied. 
 
3. Research Method 
This research “tries to explore the ways in which the socially produced ideas and objects that 
populate the world are created and maintained” (Phillips, 2003, p.222).  In doing so, this 
paper has two objectives: first, to map and analysis the discourse on corporate governance 
within codes of practice and corporate annual reports; second, to examine the extent to which 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in this discourse.  While previous research 
has studied a few aspects of the discourse across many organisational texts, this research 
investigates many aspects of the discourse across a few organisational texts.  Consequently, 
my epistemological position is interpretive structuralism and methodological position is 
qualitative.  Through a discourse analysis (Alvesson and Karreman, 2000), this research 
examines the discourse on corporate governance from a macro or long-range perspective in 
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order to contextualise Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  This approach will enable me to 
gain a deeper, richer understanding of these institutional logics (Bryman and Bell, 2003).   
 
The sample of organisational texts is draw from Crombie‟s (2009) sample.  While Crombie 
(2009) sampled a range of organisational texts produced between 1991 and 2008, this 
research samples organisational texts that were produced in recent years because these texts 
are more likely to be shaped by both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  One code of 
practice and one corporate annual report from Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom are sampled; six texts in total.   
 
The sampled texts include three codes, namely: Financial Reporting Council‟s (2006) 
Combined Code from the UK („FRC Code‟), ASX Corporate Governance Council‟s (2003) 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice from Australia („ASX Code‟), 
and Securities Commission‟s (2004) Corporate Governance in New Zealand: Principles and 
Guidelines („SecCom Code‟).  These codes are selected because they are the most influential 
and prominent.  FRC Code and ASX Code are legally enforceable.  Listed companies must 
disclose in their annual reports if they comply with these codes or explain why they do not 
comply.  SecCom Code is not legally enforceable, but is still influential as it was produced by 
a Government agency.   
 
The sampled texts also include three corporate annual reports, namely: Legal & General 
Group plc‟s 2007 Annual Report from the UK („L&G Report‟), Wesfarmers Limited‟s 2007 
Annual Report from Australia („Wesfarmers Report‟), and Hallenstein Glasson Holdings 
Limited‟s 2007 Annual Report from New Zealand („H&G Report‟).  Two criteria were used 
to select these corporate annual reports.  First, the companies selected had to be listed on only 
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one stock exchange to minimise the influence of foreign codes.  Second, the companies 
selected should be representative of the largest 50 listed companies, where representative 
means that the corporate annual report includes the average number of justifications of 
remuneration (as reported in Crombie, 2009).  L&G Report, Wesfarmers Report and H&G 
Report were randomly selected from companies in the sample that met these criteria. 
 
Phillips (2003, p.223) argues that, “Discourse analysis… is the structured and systematic 
study of collections of interrelated texts and the processes of their production, dissemination, 
and consumption.”  Both codes and corporate annual reports are sampled because these texts 
are interrelated; for example, the dissemination of codes influences the production of 
corporate annual reports (Crombie, 2009).  This discourse analysis examines the principles 
and recommendations in codes and policies and practices in corporate annual reports.  By 
systematically studying the consistency between the theoretical conceptions of Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic and the discourse on corporate governance in the codes and 
corporate annual reports, this paper reveals the extent to which these institutional logics are 
embedded in the texts.  However, it may be that the institutional logics are not deeply 
embedded in the texts.  The principles and recommendations in codes and policies and 
practices in corporate annual reports may be ambiguous, conflicting or superficial.  Therefore, 
four possible outcomes are considered: Corporate Logic only; Investor Logic only; both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic; no (or another) logic. 
 
As defined in Table 1, eights aspects of corporate governance that may vary between 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are studied.  These aspects of corporate governance are 
the most prominent in academic discourse on corporate governance and provide a clear 
distinction between institutional logics.  The discourse analysis involved multiple close 
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readings of the texts.  All phrases, sentences and paragraphs that are related to these aspects of 
corporate governance were collected from the texts, and then analysed for consistency with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  In some cases, there were insufficient quotes from 
the texts on several aspects of corporate governance for any conclusion to be made.  But in 
most cases, the quotes from the texts were highly consistent with Corporate Logic, Investor 
Logic or both logics. 
 
The main limitation of this research is that the analysis of the quotes from the texts relies on 
the subjective interpretations of the researcher.  This is unavoidable in discourse analysis.  
However, quotes from the texts are presented in this paper, so that the readers of this research 
can re-interpret my findings and conclusions.  Of course, it can be argued that I have chosen 
to include only those quotes that fit with my argument.  This is why a detailed analysis of the 
texts is available upon request.  Further, confirmation bias may have led me to choose only 
those quotes that fit with Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic.  While there are many 
institutional logics that influence organisational behaviour (Thornton et al., 2005), Corporate 
Logic and Investor Logic were not chosen prior to the research beginning.  These institutional 
logics emerged as I undertook through multiple close readings of the texts.  Therefore, this 
main limitation has been, to some extent, mitigated. 
 
4. Findings 
An overview of the codes and corporate annual reports is given in Table 2.  Two aspects of 
the texts are studied.  First, the proportion of the texts dedicated to corporate governance and 
remuneration is calculated.
1
  A comparable proportion of the codes are dedicated to corporate 
governance, but SecCom Code has a lower proportion dedicated to remuneration than the 
                                            
1 Note that words are not double counted; any words about remuneration found in sections on corporate 
governance are counted as part of remuneration.  Also note that remuneration includes words about non-
executive directors, executives and other employees.   
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other codes.  Notably, SecCom Code only has 494 words on remuneration, while FRC Code 
has 1,173 words and ASX Code has 2,091 words.  A comparable proportion of the corporate 
annual reports are dedicated to corporate governance and remuneration, but H&G Report has 
much fewer words on these matters than L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  H&G Report 
only has 1,042 words on remuneration, while L&G Report has 7,383 words and Wesfarmers 
Report has 7,182 words.   
 
Second, the remuneration principles or policies espoused in the codes and corporate annual 
report are reproduced, and the six remuneration rationales studied are typically part of these 
principles.  Principles are fundamental beliefs or propositions on which recommendations or 
practices are derived.  In both the codes and corporate annual reports, a common set of 
justifications of remuneration are found in the principles on which the recommendations in 
codes and practices in corporate annual reports are based.  Typically, these principles are: to 
attract and retain talented executives; to pay executives at a competitive level in the market; 
and to link executive remuneration to firm performance.  However, these principles are 
general (or non-specific) in nature.  This affords decision-makers much flexibility in 
determining remuneration recommendations and practices as is shown in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
The remuneration principles and policies from the codes and corporate annual reports are 
broadly consistent with both logics.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, executives are depicted 
as being high-quality or talented, rather than opportunistic.  However, L&G‟s policy does 
imply that incentives are necessary to align executives‟ interests with those of shareholders, 
which is consistent with Investor Logic.  Fairness, in the broadest sense of the word, is 
emphasised as executive remuneration ensures horizontal equity (between executives) and 
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vertical equity (executives compared to employees and shareholder returns).  This is also 
consistent with Corporate Logic.  But consistent with Investor Logic, the remuneration 
policies assert that executive remuneration should be dependent on firm performance.  
However, these remuneration policies are also non-specific.  Further analysis is required to 
determine whether this consistency with both logics remains as these policies are elaborated 
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Table 2: Overview of Selected Texts 
 Word Count Remuneration Principles or Policies 
Codes of Practice   
UK: FRC Code (2006) 1. Total: 7,669 words 
2. Corporate Governance 
(CG): 6,255 words (82%) 
3. Remuneration (REM): 
1,173 words (15%) 
“Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and motivate directors of the quality 
required to run the company successfully, but a company should avoid paying more than is necessary for 
this purpose. A significant proportion of executive directors‟ remuneration should be structured so as to 
link rewards to corporate and individual performance.” (p11)  “There should be a formal and transparent 
procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and for fixing the remuneration packages of 
individual directors. No director should be involved in deciding his or her own remuneration.” (p.12) 
AU: ASX Code (2003) 1. Total: 16,686 words 
2. CG: 14,102 words (85%) 
3. REM: 2,091 words (13%) 
“Principle 9: Remunerate fairly and responsibly  Ensure that the level and composition of 
remuneration is sufficient and reasonable and that its relationship to corporate and individual performance 
is defined. This means that companies need to adopt remuneration policies that attract and maintain 
talented and motivated directors and employees so as to encourage enhanced performance of the 
company. It is important that there be a clear relationship between performance and remuneration, and 
that the policy underlying executive remuneration be understood by investors.” (p.51) 
NZ: SecCom Code (2004) 1. Total: 7,620 words 
2. CG: 6,695 words (88%) 
3. REM: 494 words (6%) 
“The remuneration of directors and executives should be transparent, fair, and reasonable. The board 
should have a clear policy for setting remuneration of executives (including executive directors) and non-
executive directors at levels that are fair and reasonable in a competitive market for the skills, knowledge 
and experience required by the entity.” (p.17) 
Corporate Annual Reports   
UK: Legal & General (2007) 1. Total: 89,605 words 
2. CG: 8,936 words (10%) 
3. REM: 7,383 words (8%) 
“The Group‟s remuneration policy is broadly consistent for all employees and is designed to support 
recruitment, motivation and retention. Remuneration is considered within the overall context of the 
Group‟s sector and the markets in which the divisions operate. The policy for the majority of employees 
continues to be to pay around the relevant mid-market level with a package designed to align the interests 
of employees with those of shareholders, with an appropriate proportion of total remuneration dependent 
upon performance. Management work in partnership with the trade union, Unite, to ensure our pay 
policies and practices are free from unfair bias. This is monitored by an annual equal pay audit.” (p.49) 
AU: Wesfarmers (2007) 1. Total: 64,560 words 
2. CG: 8,809 words (14%) 
3. REM: 7,182 words (11%) 
“Wesfarmers aligns its remuneration policies with shareholder interests by setting performance targets for 
senior executives that are based on factors that are under their control and that maximise long-term total 
shareholder returns. These policies are directed at attracting, motivating and retaining quality people. Key 
principles in developing the remuneration structure and levels are: creation of shareholder value; market 
competitiveness; and recognition of individual performance. Alignment with these principles is achieved 
through a variable pay structure. Annual incentives are heavily weighted to return on capital and earnings 
before interest and tax measures, and long term incentives have a return on equity focus…” (p.125) 
NZ: Hallenstein Glasson 
(2007) 
1. Total: 14,195 words 
2. CG: 2,268 words (16%) 
3. REM: 1,042 words (7%) 
“The function of the [Remuneration] Committee is to make specific recommendations on remuneration 
packages and other terms of employment for Directors and executive Directors. The Committee utilises 
independent advice where necessary to ensure remuneration practices are appropriate for the Company, 
and to ensure the best possible people are recruited and retained.” (p.39) 
Institutional Logics of Corporate Governance     Page 15 
Table 3 highlights the extent to which Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic are embedded in 
selected codes of practice and corporate annual reports.  Embedded refers to the degree of 
consistency between theoretical conceptions of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic and 
public discourse on corporate governance (including executive remuneration).  Consistency is 
judged across eight aspects of corporate governance.  While there are degrees of consistency, 
consistency is reported on an absolute basis in Table 3.  Thus, there are four possibilities: No 
logic
2
, Corporate Logic, Investor Logic, or both logics.  However, the symbolic or substantive 
nature of this public discourse is not analysed.  While Corporate Logic and Investor Logic 





Summarised in Table 3, the discourse analysis shows that Investor Logic is more deeply 
embedded than Corporate Logic in the codes of practice, whereas both Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic are deeply embedded in the corporate annual reports.  The principles and 
recommendations found in codes of practice are comparable.  Of the eight aspects of 
corporate governance, there are three aspects where there are differences between the codes of 
practice.  The policies and practices found in corporate annual reports are comparable, but 
there are many subtle differences.  Of the eight aspects of corporate governance, there are 
only three aspects where there are not differences between the corporate annual reports.  
Further, there are many differences between the codes and corporate annual reports.  These 
similarities and differences are discussed in depth in the following section. 
 
                                            
2
 In this context, no logic means that there is insufficient discourse on a particular aspect of corporate governance 
for a conclusion to be made, or the discourse on a particular aspect of corporate governance was inconsistent 
with both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
3 Public discourse refers to texts that are made freely available to anyone, whereas private discourse refers to 
texts that are not freely available to anyone.  The public may not know of the existence of some texts.  
Further, remuneration practices are not observable.  The public learns of remuneration practices through texts 
such as corporate annual reports.  Remuneration practices, which are described in public texts, can be 
symbolic as how remuneration is determined in private may be different to how it is described in public.  
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Table 3: Institutional Logic/s Embedded in Selected Codes of Practice and Corporate Annual Reports 
Aspects of Corporate Governance 
and Remuneration  
UK: FRC Code 
(2006) 
AU: ASX Code 
(2003) 
NZ: SecCom Code 
(2004) 





NZ: H&G’s 2007 
Annual Report 
Human behaviour Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Corporate objective Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic Corporate Logic Investor Logic 
Independence of the board of directors Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
Role of the board of directors 
(particularly non-executive directors) 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
Role of the remuneration committee Investor Logic Investor Logic --- Investor Logic Investor Logic Investor Logic 
Remuneration policies and practices 
for non-executive directors 
Investor Logic Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Investor Logic Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Investor Logic 
Remuneration policies and practices 
for executives 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic  
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Performance measures for evaluating 
executives 
Investor Logic --- --- Corporate Logic 
and Investor Logic 
Corporate Logic Corporate Logic 
Overall (No. of times each logic is 
present in each text) 
Corporate Logic 
(3) and Investor 
Logic (8) 
Corporate Logic 
(3) and Investor 
Logic (7) 
Corporate Logic 
(4) and Investor 
Logic (6) 
Corporate Logic 
(6) and Investor 
Logic (7) 
Corporate Logic 
(7) and Investor 
Logic (5) 
Corporate Logic 
(4) and Investor 
Logic (5) 
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Human behaviour is portrayed in a different ways in the texts.  Consistent with Investor 
Logic, the codes depict directors and executives as corruptible and self-interested.  For 
example, FRC Code (2006, p.4) contends that, “No one individual should have unfettered 
powers of decision.”  Consistent with Corporate Logic, directors, executives and other 
employees are praised in L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  For example, Wesfarmers‟ 
(2007, p.5) Chairman writes, “I would… like to extend a personal vote of thanks to my fellow 
directors for their hard work and tireless contribution.”  No thanks are given in H&G‟s 
Chairman‟s letter.  Instead, consistent with Investor Logic, the Chairman argues that 
shareholders should adopt a new share purchase scheme “…to align the interests of senior 
executives with those of the shareholders” (H&G, 2007, p.7).  
 
The corporate objective is shareholder-orientated in the codes and H&G Report, and 
stakeholder-oriented in L&G Report and Wesfarmers Report.  In the texts, shareholders are 
separated from other stakeholders and maximising shareholder value is believed to be 
compatible with economic growth.  For example, SecCom Code (2004, p.3) opines that, 
“Good corporate governance should… attract support from investors and other stakeholders… 
[and] make businesses more… financially sustainable.”  While discourse in texts is often 
consistent with Investor Logic, the corporate objectives of L&G and Wesfarmers treat all 
stakeholders as separate ends and are consistent with Corporate Logic.  For example, L&G 
(2007, p.ii) state that there corporate objective is “…to deliver sustainable benefits for 
customers, shareholders and employees.”   
 
Corporate governance concerns the definition of director independence and the proportion of 
directors that are deemed independent.  While director independence is defined in financial 
terms in the texts, independence of mind is also emphasised.  For example, Wesfarmers 
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(2007, p.46) states that both non-executive and executives directors “bring independent views 
and judgement to the Board‟s deliberations.”  These definitions are consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  Further, the codes recommend that the board should be 
comprised of a majority of independent non-executive directors, and the companies do adhere 
to this recommendation.  However, the codes also recommend that the board should include 
“an appropriate balance of executive and non-executive directors” (SecCom, 2004, p.9), and 
the companies‟ boards also include executive directors.  Again, this is consistent with both 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
The role of the board of directors that is recommended in codes and declared in corporate 
annual reports is to both monitor and advise executives.  Consistent with Investor Logic, a 
control role is strongly emphasised in the texts.  For example, L&G (2007, p.44) affirm that, 
“the Board regularly reviews major projects, considers operating and financial issues and 
monitors performance against plan.”  Consistent with Corporate Logic, a strategic role is also 
strongly emphasised in the texts.  For example, SecCom Code (2004, p.10) states that, “The 
board must guide the strategic direction of the entity, and direct and oversee management.”  
Non-executive directors are capable of being both advisors to and evaluators of executives.  
The texts offer no comment on the potential for conflict between these roles.   
 
The role of the remuneration committee is to design a general framework for the company‟s 
remuneration practices, design the CEO‟s remuneration practices, monitor the performance of 
the CEO and determine how much the CEO will be paid.  This role may also include 
approving the remuneration of other senior executives.  Described in comparable terms in the 
texts (except SecCom Code), the role of the remuneration committee is consistent with 
Investor Logic.  For example, Wesfarmers (2007, p.126) states that, “The Remuneration 
Committee is responsible for reviewing and making recommendations to the Board on 
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remuneration policies for the company”.  SecCom Code barely mentions the remuneration 
committee, so no conclusion regarding consistency with institutional logics is made.  
However, a role encompassing non-financial and intrinsic motivation – consistent with 
Corporate Logic – is not mentioned in any of the texts. 
 
The remuneration policies and practices for non-executive directors in the texts are broadly 
consistent with Investor Logic.  However, justification of the level of non-executive directors‟ 
fees in SecCom Code (2004) and Wesfarmers Report, which is consistent with Corporate 
Logic. Overall, non-executive directors only receive fees; they do not receive incentives or 
retirement payments.  This reinforces the financial independence of non-executive directors.  
Aside from shareholder voting against directors‟ re-election, how to control the (assumed) 
self-interested behaviour of non-executive directors is not discussed.  However, L&G (2007, 
p.50) does require, “Non-executive directors use at least 50% of their fees, after UK tax, to 
buy Legal & General shares…”  While this practice reduces the financial independence of 
non-executive directors, it is still consistent with Investor Logic.
4
   
 
The remuneration policies and practice for executives in the texts are broadly consistent with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  A range of justifications of remuneration practices 
are found in all of the texts.  For example, FRC Code‟s (2006, p.11) main remuneration 
principle states that, “Levels of remuneration should be sufficient to attract, retain and 
motivate directors of the quality required… but a company should avoid paying more than is 
necessary for this purpose. A significant proportion… should be [linked] to corporate and 
individual performance.”  Similarly, recommended in the codes and described in the annual 
reports are packages that include elements of fixed and variable remuneration.  Consistent 
                                            
4 This is a logical inconsistent with Investor Logic.  Non-executive directors are assumed to be financially 
independent as long as their shareholding is small.  However, small shareholdings may be financially 
significant for non-executive directors who have small investment portfolios.   
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with Investor Logic, the texts emphasise short- and long-term incentives more than other 
aspects of remuneration.   
 
Short-term incentives are dependent on performance measures.  The codes do not recommend 
any specific performance measures be used, but do recommend a general approach.  For 
example, SecCom Code (2004, p.17) prescribes that, “Executive… remuneration packages 
should include an element that is dependent on entity and individual performance.” A range 
of financial and non-financial performance measures are listed in the annual reports of L&G 
and Wesfarmers, but not H&G.  However, it may be that the performance measures focus on 
stakeholder value, particularly as market-based measures (such as total shareholder return) are 
not included.  For example, L&G (2007, p.50) state that, “The Company is committed to 
treating customers fairly and this is also reflected appropriately in bonus objectives.”  Overall, 
the performance measures recommended and selected in the texts are loosely consistent with 
both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic. 
 
Long-term incentives are also dependent on performance measures. FRC Code recommends 
that relative total shareholder return be used to measure long-term performance. ASX Code 
and SecCom Code do not recommend any specific performance measures, but do caution 
against using performance measures that may encourage myopic behaviour amongst 
executives.  This is consistent with Investor Logic.  Long-term incentives at L&G are based 
relative total shareholder return over three years, which is also consistent with Investor Logic. 
In contrast, long-term incentives at Wesfarmers are based on relative and absolute return on 
equity, and H&G are not conditional (H&G provide executives with interest-free loans to 
purchase H&G shares).  Wesfarmers uses an absolute return on equity target for executive 
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directors because its objective is “providing a satisfactory [not maximum] return to 
shareholders” (Wesfarmers, 2007, p.125).  This is consistent with Corporate Logic. 
 
5. Discussion 
Multiple writers produce both codes and corporate annual reports.  The writers may have 
different backgrounds, motives and perceptions of an organisation‟s intentions and actions.  
Given that the finding have shown that the sampled texts are ordered and structured in a 
comparable manner and have a stable definition of corporate governance, the multiple writers 
of the texts are most likely influenced by the same institutional logics.  The writers may 
intend for the texts to provide incremental informative to stakeholders (Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan, 2007), meaning that the texts are a faithful representation of the intentions and 
actions of the organisations.  Alternatively, the writers may intend the texts to give 
stakeholders a favourable impression of the organisations (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007), 
meaning that the texts are, to some extent, decoupled from the intentions and actions of the 
organisations.  In any case, the institutional logics have shaped the writers‟ perceptions of 
what ought to be (normative) and what is (descriptive) in terms of corporate governance. 
 
This research proposed that there are four possible institutional positions: No logic; Corporate 
Logic; Investor Logic; and Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic.  The evidence shows 
that both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded, to varying degrees, in the 
sampled texts.  To accept this conclusion is to reject the possibility that there is no logic 
embedded in the texts.  Alvarez and Mazzo (2000) argue that the managers are not shaped by 
texts, but are intelligent consumers of texts.  It may be that the writers of codes and corporate 
annual reports choose what ideas and practices to adopt and ignore.  From this perspective, 
the recommendations in codes and practices in corporate annual reports are a result of 
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intelligent design and organisational learning (Zajac and Westphal, 2004).  However, despite 
the subtle differences between the texts, the writers of the sampled texts are reproducing 
comparable ideas and practices.  Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have become the 
fashionable and rational way of writing about corporate governance.  
 
Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that investors react favourably to the adoption of long-term 
incentive plans and their reaction is more favourable when justified using Investor Logic, 
irrespective of whether the plans were implemented (or used).  They argue that investors are 
fooled by symbolic disclosure.  However, this research does not investigate the symbolic or 
substantive nature of the practices described in corporate annual reports.  It may be that 
directors who attest that incentive schemes are necessary to attract and retain talented 
executives and align executives‟ interests to those of shareholders, are writing what investors 
and other stakeholders want to read.  Directors may believe that incentives schemes are 
necessary for other reasons.  Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) argue that incentive schemes 
are used to enrich executives, rather than rewarding executives‟ efforts to maximise 
shareholder value.  It may be that the corporate annual reports are highly symbolic.  However, 
whether symbolic or substantive in nature, both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are 
powerful Mega-Discourses that shape the public discourse on corporate governance. 
  
Zajac and Westphal (2004) argued that US corporations and capital markets transitioned from 
Corporate Logic to Investor Logic in the mid 1980s.  However, Crombie et al. (2010) found 
that both logics are deeply embedded in the 2007 proxy statements of US corporations.  
Similarly, Crombie (2009) found that both logics are deeply embedded in the 2007 corporate 
annual reports of Australia, New Zealand and UK publicly listed companies.  But these 
studies do not show whether both logics can co-exist in the same institutional setting, are 
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competing for dominance or have merged into a new institutional logic.  This paper‟s findings 
suggest that Corporate Logic and Investor Logic have merged despite the opposing 
assumptions of these logics.  Corporate Logic justifies how much directors and executives are 
remunerated, while Investor Logic justifies how directors and executives are remunerated.  
Corporate Logic‟s assumption that directors and executives are knowledgeable, trustworthy 
professions tempers Investor Logic‟s assumptions that directors and executives are self-
interested.   
 
A merging of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic is consistent with Jensen‟s (2001) 
enlightened stakeholder theory, where shareholder value is maximised in the long-term by 
satisfying the needs of stakeholders such as customers and employees.  A merging of both 
logics also supports a pragmatic view of human behaviour, where some individuals are self-
interested and will act opportunistically.  In this context, codes set out the minimum standard 
of corporate governance.  Incentives and controls are required to deter the minority of 
individuals from acting opportunistically.  Corporate annual reports describe the current 
practice of corporate governance, where directors are both monitors of and advisors to 
executives.  This is supported by Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) and Roberts et al. (2005) 
arguments of moving beyond either/or prescriptions of corporate governance.  Despite the 
ambiguity inherent in a merging of Corporate Logic and Investor Logic, codes and corporate 
annual reports present a framing of corporate governance that both protects stakeholders from 
opportunistic executives, encourages executives to think and act in the long-term interests of 
stakeholders, and provides directors and executives a significant degree of professional 
autonomy is deciding how to balance the competing interests of stakeholders. 
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6. Conclusion 
Both Corporate Logic and Investor Logic are embedded in the selected codes and corporate 
annual reports.  This is exemplified by the range of justifications of remuneration found in the 
texts.  Consistent with Corporate Logic, the codes have a principles-based, comply-or-explain 
approach and non-specific recommendations; whereas consistent with Investor Logic, the 
codes assume executives are opportunistic as only non-executives directors who are 
financially independent are able to monitor executives and financial incentives are required to 
align the interests of executives with those of shareholders.  Further, consistent with corporate 
logic, the corporate objectives of L&G and Wesfarmers are stakeholder-oriented and the 
corporate annual reports depict directors and executives as trustworthy, knowledgeable 
professionals; whereas consistent with Investor Logic, the corporate annual reports require 
non-executive directors to be financial independent and use financial incentives to align the 
interests of executives with those of shareholders. 
 
While Zajac and Westphal (2004) argue that there has been a transition from Corporate Logic 
to Investor Logic, the evidence presented in this paper indicates that Corporate Logic and 
Investor Logic co-exist in the sampled texts.  Despite only six texts being sampled, this 
finding is significant become these texts are representative (Crombie, 2009) and span three 
countries, namely Australia, New Zealand and the UK.  Further, the evidence indicates that 
Corporate Logic and Investor Logic may have merged into a new institutional logic.  In this 
sense, Corporate Logic tempers Investor Logic‟s harsh assumptions about human behaviour 
and implications for the independence of the board of director and executive remuneration 
that is contingent.  Combined, Corporate Logic and Investor Logic define how corporate 
governance should be and is practiced.  This is a pragmatic approach, where investors and 
regulators are trusting of directors and executives, but only to a point.  Codes set out 
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minimum standards of corporate governance, and compliance by directors is attested to in 
corporate annual reports.  Beyond this, corporate annual reports also explain how directors 
balance the competing interests of stakeholders and both monitor and advise executives. 
 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003; 2006) argue that executives exert power over the board of directors 
and use this power to enrich themselves at the expense of shareholders.  This ties in with 
Westphal and Zajac‟s (1998) argument that proxy statements (or corporate annual reports) are 
rhetorical and symbolic in nature; corporate discourse is designed to persuade stakeholders of 
the trustworthiness of directors and executives, which, if successful, reinforces directors and 
executives power to control corporations.  It may be that the policies and practices of 
corporate governance that are described in corporate annual reports are decoupled from how 
boards of directors make decisions behind closed doors.  Further research should investigate 
how directors and executives think and act in order to determine the extent to which 
Corporate Logic and/or Investor Logic are embedded in private discourse.  Such research 
should be longitudinal in order to gain insight into the processes of (de-)institutionalisation. 
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